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Abstract 
The smartphone has been the ubiquitous computing 
platform in the past decade. However, emerging 
consumer Internet of Things (IoT) technology trends, 
such as smartwatches and smart speakers, promise the 
establishment of new ubiquitous platforms. We model 
two competing horizontally-differentiated platforms 
that each offer a smartphone and another smart device. 
This market diverges markedly from standard mixed 
bundling results when devices from the same vendor 
have super-additive utility. We show that the degree of 
a smart device’s differentiation (relative to the 
smartphone) is the prime factor determining if it is 
profitable to deepen integration between a smart device 
with the incumbent smartphone platform. We provide 
managerial insights for technology strategy. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Mobile computing in the form of smartphones is a 
dominant technological platform today [13]. However, 
the Internet of Things (IoT) promises a broad array of 
interconnected products ranging from tiny fitness 
trackers to smart homes. 
The key question that this paper explores in a 
rigorous analytical-modeling approach is the following: 
How will the emerging trends of wearables (e.g., Apple 
Watch, Android Wear, Pebble) and smart-home 
appliances (e.g., Amazon Echo, Apple HomePod, 
Google Home) impact smartphones and the mobile 
computing platform that dominates devices today? 
We focus on smartwatches and smart speakers as 
contrasting ends of the consumer IoT spectrum. At 
present, many vendors have developed smart devices 
that depend on an interoperable/compatible smartphone 
in order to function. Thus, the smart device functions as 
a “hardware app” that is a complement to its compatible 
smartphone platform and adds value to that platform 
                                                 
1 A “single-homing” user – for example a consumer who purchase a 
smartwatch – will use only that one watch… at least until she replaces 
it with a newer model. A “multi-homing” user – for example a 
through cross-sided network effects: The more apps and 
the more devices compatible to a given smartphone 
platform, the more valuable the platform itself, which 
attracts more users and attracts more apps (and 
potentially more compatible devices). In this scenario, 
an Apple Watch adds value to the iOS platform and 
attracts more users to it. In a competitive setting with 
single-homing users,1 the more “successful” the Apple 
Watch, the more the Apple ecosystems will benefit, and 
the Android ecosystem will suffer. 
However, this situation is unlikely to be permanent. 
When a smart device becomes independent enough and 
developers build applications for them directly, the 
next-generation smart device may transform from a 
networked complement into a networked substitute. 
We formalize the above observations in a 
competitive setting of two competing smartphone 
platforms [17], each offering complementary smart 
devices. We characterize market outcomes in terms of 
prices, market-shares, and profits and do sensitivity 
analysis examining how various market parameters 
affect the market outcomes. We identify various eras of 
connected device evolution and examine how next-
generation connected devices in each era may affect 
today’s dominant client-side computing platform, the 
smartphone.  
 
2. Background 
We discuss related literature on network effects in 
platforms and the Internet of Things. 
 
2.1. Network effects in platforms 
 
The paper is related to the broad network effects [10] 
and platform economics literatures [3,11,17]. This 
literature has been reviewed broadly by Rochet & Tirole 
[18]. In addition, Heitkotter et al. [15] argued that two-
sided markets literature is useful in understanding the 
economics of mobile computing and related strategic 
smartphone app developer – might decide to sell apps on both 
competing smartphone platforms, iOS and Android. 
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question. In the rest, we highlight articles from the 
closest specific strand: bundling and tying in two-sided 
markets. 
Research on information goods has shown that 
bundling might be an extremely profitable strategy [2, 
14, 16]. Moreover, tying (when two or more products or 
services are offered only as a bundle and they are not 
available individually) can be used as a mechanism for 
foreclosing a market [5, 19]. Doganoglu & Wright [9] 
analyzed the ability of an incumbent to use introductory 
offers to dominate a network market in the face of a 
more efficient rival. Amelio & Jullien [1] showed that 
firms can use tying to subsidize participation in two-
sided markets, and that tying increases social welfare 
when network effects are strong. Choi [6] showed that 
tying induces more consumers to multihome and makes 
platform specific exclusive content available to more 
consumers, so tying can be welfare enhancing if 
multihoming is allowed. Gans [12] proposed antitrust 
remedies for tying and found conditions under which 
those remedies will be effective in improving social 
welfare. Choi & Jeon [7] proposed a leverage theory of 
tying in two-sided markets, motivated by antitrust 
investigations concerning Google. Carlton & Waldman 
[4] analyzed exclusive channel and revenue sharing 
strategies in a context of suppliers and retailers. Overall, 
most of this literature is concerned about welfare 
implications, and related antitrust issues, while our main 
focus is strategic interaction and the impact of 
technology. 
 
2.2. Internet of Things 
 
The Internet of Things theme has attracted 
substantial attention in industry reports and in the 
computer science and engineering literature [20]. 
In general, the concept refers to everyday things that 
have processing power, sensor, and actuator 
capabilities, and are interconnected with the rest of the 
Internet. As an example, as of September 2018, Apple 
announced the Series 4 of its Apple Watch with fitness 
tracking and other health-oriented capabilities. In the 
context of smart homes, Amazon announced a new 
series of smart speakers and related devices, including a 
smart microwave.  
 Over time, IoT will be ubiquitous, context-aware 
and provide ambient intelligence. Application areas 
could include supply chains, manufacturing, agriculture, 
energy, healthcare, etc. All these could be thought of as 
industrial IoT.  
Our research is more close to the consumer IoT, 
which includes wearables, smart homes, smart cars and 
other related applications geared towards consumer 
markets. IoT promises the integration of physical and 
digital world and the creation of new value, but it also 
entails challenges such as security and privacy. 
Overall, while the IoT is considered one of the most 
significant contemporary tech trends, there is limited 
economics research on the topic. Our research aims to 
start filling this gap. 
 
3. Model 
 
We consider a model in which two competing 
platform owners each offer a smartphone and a 
complementary product. We introduce our model with 
smartwatches as the complementary products, and then 
discuss smart speakers as a change in model parameters. 
Each platform connects app developers with 
consumers to create positive cross-side network effects. 
Consumers have unit demand for at most one 
smartphone and at most one smartwatch (i.e., they 
single-home separately for each product), while 
developers can multi-home costlessly to make apps for 
any combination of the four products in a market. The 
network effects are independent for each product. 
Consumers have horizontal preferences for products 
that we model as uniformly distributed locations in a 
Hotelling square such as Figure 1, with the x-axis related 
to smartwatches and y-axis related to smartphones, and 
misfit disutility arises from the distance “traveled” on 
each axis. Developers have design goals that are easier 
to realize on some products than others, so we distribute 
developers uniformly across a similar Hotelling square. 
We discuss correlated misfit costs in Subsection 4.4. 
 
Figure 1: Hotelling square of preferences for 
smartphones and smartwatches. 
 
Even with independent network effects and 
uncorrelated misfit costs, synergy exists between a 
vendor’s products that increases the value to a developer 
or consumer. The exogenous parameter measuring this 
synergy – s for developers and S for consumers – is a 
strictly positive increase to value before price is 
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considered. For example, a consumer purchasing both 
products from the same vendor receives (1 + S) times 
the sum of individual product utilities, less the disutility 
associated with prices. 
We index a bundle by the watch and phone 
purchased (or developed for).  indicates that the 
device is not part of the bundle, while A and B represent 
the vendors’ offerings. Therefore, {A,A} represents a 
bundle of the first vendor’s smartwatch and smartphone, 
while {,B} represents purchasing only the second 
vendor’s smartphone. 
In the following utility and value functions, I is an 
indicator function; C refers to consumer, D to developer, 
i to watch vendor, j to phone vendor, N to cross-side 
network effect, P to price (or phone in subscripts), Q to 
quantity/market-share, S to synergy, T to transport/
misfit cost, U to consumer utility, V to developer value, 
W in subscripts to watch, x to smartwatch preference, 
and y to smartphone preference. For parameters that 
affect Consumers and Developers separately, uppercase 
(e.g., NW) applies to Consumers, and lowercase (e.g., 
nW) applies to Developers. 
 
𝑢𝑊∅(𝑥) = 0 
𝑢𝑊𝐴(𝑥) = 𝑢𝑊 + 𝑁𝑊𝑞𝑊𝐴 − 𝑥 ∙ 𝑇𝑊 
𝑢𝑊𝐵(𝑥) = 𝑢𝑊 + 𝑁𝑊𝑞𝑊𝐵 − (1 − 𝑥)𝑇𝑊 
 
𝑢𝑃∅(𝑦) = 0 
𝑢𝑃𝐴(𝑦) = 𝑢𝑃 + 𝑁𝑃𝑞𝑃𝐴 − 𝑦 ∙ 𝑇𝑃 
𝑢𝑃𝐵(𝑦) = 𝑢𝑃 + 𝑁𝑃𝑞𝑃𝐵 − (1 − 𝑦)𝑇𝑃 
 
𝑈𝑖,𝑗(𝑥, 𝑦) = [𝑢𝑊𝑖(𝑥) + 𝑢𝑃𝑗(𝑦)] × (1 + 𝐼𝑖=𝑗 ∙ 𝑆) − 𝑃𝑖,𝑗 
 
𝑣𝑊∅(𝑥) = 0 
𝑣𝑊𝐴(𝑥) = 𝑣𝑊 + 𝑛𝑊𝑄𝑊𝐴 − 𝑥 ∙ 𝑡𝑊 
𝑣𝑊𝐵(𝑥) = 𝑣𝑊 + 𝑛𝑊𝑄𝑊𝐵 − (1 − 𝑥)𝑡𝑊 
 
𝑣𝑃∅(𝑦) = 0 
𝑣𝑃𝐴(𝑦) = 𝑣𝑃 + 𝑛𝑃𝑄𝑃𝐴 − 𝑦 ∙ 𝑡𝑃 
𝑣𝑃𝐵(𝑦) = 𝑣𝑃 + 𝑛𝑃𝑄𝐶(𝑃𝐵) − (1 − 𝑦)𝑡𝑃 
 
𝑉𝑖,𝑗(𝑥, 𝑦) = [𝑣𝑊𝑖(𝑥) + 𝑣𝑃𝑗(𝑦)] × (1 + 𝐼𝑖=𝑗 ∙ 𝑠) − 𝑝𝑖,𝑗 
 
All exogenous parameters are strictly positive 
except for taste indices, which range over the closed 
interval [0,1]. Market shares such as QWA are 
endogenously determined and also range over [0,1]. We 
employ the common convention that cross-side network 
effects are proportional to market share on the other side 
of the network. 
We introduce bundles in four eras. The first era 
represents the market before app-enabled smartwatches. 
The second era adds single-vendor bundles wherein a 
smartwatch only functions if the consumer also owns 
the matching smartphone. The third era improves 
smartwatches into stand-alone devices, which also 
permits consumers to mix and match between vendors 
if desired. Finally, the fourth era adds additional phone-
like functions to smartwatches. 
 
4. Results  
 
We present the results of our model in chronological 
order across four eras. Formal analytical proofs of our 
Lemmas and Propositions are omitted due to space 
limitations in the proceedings. For the figures 
illustrating market outcomes, we choose model 
parameters that ensure that all intersections of interest 
occur within the Hotelling square. 
 
4.1. Smartphones only 
  
In the first era (before app-enabled smartwatches or 
smart speakers), the only bundles available to 
consumers are {,}, {,A} and {,B}.  
With symmetric firms, the standard result obtains 
that each has a market share of one-half and charges a 
price equal to the transport cost tP (Figure 2). That is, 
firms compete away the network effect on the consumer 
side, which vastly increases the region of the parameter 
space that admits full coverage of Consumers. 
Note that for symmetric firms, the standard result 
obtains that each has a market share of one-half and 
charges a price equal to the transport cost tP. See the left 
panel of Figure 2. That is, firms compete away the 
network effect on the consumer side, which vastly 
increases the region of the parameter space that admits 
full coverage of Consumers. 
 
Lemma 1: The condition for full market coverage of 
smartphone Consumers in the presence of network 
effects is 2uP + NP(qPA + qPB) ≥ 3TP, which is a looser 
constraint than the standard uP ≥ 3TP without network 
effects. Firms charge Consumers TP and Developers 
vP/2 + nP/4 when an interior solution obtains, serving a 
fraction [vP/2 + nP/4]/tP of Developers. Each firm’s 
profit is TP/2 from Consumers plus [(vP/2 + nP/4)2]/tP 
from Developers.■ 
 
The intuition behind this result is that network 
effects are competed away on the Consumer side with 
single-homing customers, but not on the multi-homing 
Developer side. The free utility from cross-side network 
effects makes full coverage on the Consumer side likely. 
Firms attract Developers independent of their activity 
with the competing firm, so the prices offered to 
Developers are those of local monopolists.  
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 Era 1: Phones Only 
 
Era 2: Phones and Bundles Only 
 
Era 3: All Combinations Available 
 
Figure 2. Consumer market shares across three eras with S = 1/4, TW = 5/8 and TP = 1/2. The 
horizontal axis measures taste for watches while the vertical axis measures taste for phones. 
Developer market shares are much simpler because firms treat multi-homing developers as if 
the other firm does not exist. 
We assume an interior solution for Developer 
market shares because this implies that some 
Developers sell on one platform but not the other, and 
this represents the real market for Developers. An 
interior solution places two mild constraints on 
transport/taste costs: 
 
Assumption 1: Developer misfit costs are at least 
tP > (vP/2 + nP/4) > 0.■  
 
Assumption 2: Consumer misfit costs are in the range 
(2/3×[uP + NP(vP/2 + nP/4)/tP]) ≥ TP > 0.■ 
 
4.2. Smartwatches complement smartphones 
  
This era adds bundles {A,A} and {B,B} which have 
super-additive utility. Firms will keep the existing 
phone prices – which guarantee a fully covered 
Consumer market for the older product – rather than bet 
on a risky new product being able to saturate the 
Consumer market with smartphone/smartwatch 
bundles. Given the more varied form factors and less 
flexible interface, it follows that misfit costs would be 
different in each dimension.  
 
Assumption 3: Smartwatch tastes are stronger than 
smartphone tastes such that TW > TP and tW > tP.■ 
 
Proposition 1: Firms charge Consumers TW for 
smartwatches and Developers vW/2 + nW/4 when an 
interior solution obtains, serving a fraction 
[vW/2 + nW/4]/tW of Developers. Each firm’s profit is 
TW/2 from Consumers plus [(vW/2 + nW/4)2]/tW from 
Developers.■ 
 
 
 
Era 4: Future device with α = 1/8 
 
Era 4: Future device with α = 1/4 
 
Era 4: Future device with α = 3/8 
 
Figure 3. Consumer market shares with S = 1/4, TW = 5/8 and TP = 1/2 when the future watch device 
becomes available over three values of α. The horizontal axis measures taste for pure watches 
while the vertical axis measures taste for phones. 
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The intuition behind this result is that the super-
additive utility (i.e., complementarity) from a bundle 
induces Consumers with strong smartphone preferences 
or smartwatch preferences to purchase the bundle. If 
misfit costs are very low, all Consumers purchase 
bundles. Otherwise, some Consumers keep their 
original “bundles” of {,A} and {,B}. Although the 
market shares have changed shape, indicating platform 
switching, each firm still sells smartphones to 50% of 
the Consumers and sells smartwatches to some fraction 
of its Consumers. We illustrate the impact in the middle 
panel of Figure 2. Smartwatches are revenue-enhancing 
for both firms.  
 
4.3. Stand-alone smartwatches 
  
This era adds bundles {A,}, {A,B}, {B,} and 
{B,A}, for example enhancing the smartwatch with 
independent GPS and phone-call ability (e.g., Apple 
Watch Series 3). Era 3 allows most of the holdouts in 
Era 2 to purchase a smartwatch that meets their tastes, 
further improving vendor revenues once the market 
reaches equilibrium. The right panel in Figure 2 shows 
the market outcome. 
 
Proposition 2: Adding unbundled smartwatches causes 
no Consumers to switch smartwatches, but some 
Consumers do purchase smartwatches who had not done 
so when they were only available in single-vendor 
bundles. Some of the Consumers who newly purchase 
smartwatches switch smartphones.■ 
 
The intuition behind this result is that anyone who 
purchased a smartwatch in Era 2 enjoys super-additive 
utility from a bundle, and a newly available unbundled 
smartwatch without super-additive utility will not cause 
any of those Consumers to switch. On the other hand, 
Consumers just below the top-left and just above the 
bottom-right were only induced to purchase those 
phones due to the synergy of bundling with their 
preferred smartwatch. For these marginal phone 
purchasers, the ability to pick one from A and one from 
B allows them to switch back to their preferred phone. 
 
4.4. Phone-like smartwatches 
  
In this era, a future watch with smartphone 
functionality becomes its own device with a blending of 
the transport costs. Note that the ability to place phone 
calls is not in itself a differentiating feature (or even 
unique to Era 4… it became available in Era 3). Rather, 
we refer to the smartwatch acquiring some of the look 
and feel of the firm’s smartphone offering. For a given 
fraction α of “phone-ness,” the utility function for firm 
A’s future device is: 
 
𝑢𝑊𝐴(𝑥, 𝑦) =  
𝑢𝑊 + 𝑁𝑊𝑞𝑊𝐴 − √1 − 𝛼2 ∙ 𝑥 ∙ 𝑇𝑊 − 𝛼 ∙ 𝑦 ∙ 𝑇𝑃  
 
Note that setting α = 0 recreates Era 3, but here we 
shall only consider the case of strictly positive α.  
 
Proposition 3: Adding smartphone features to the 
smartwatch, such that it causes a blend of misfit costs 
across the phone and watch dimensions, decreases 
smartwatch sales and firm profit.■ 
 
 
   
Era 1: Phones Only 
 
Era 2: Phones and Bundles Only 
 
Era 3: All Combinations Available 
 
Figure 4. Consumer market shares with S = 1/4, TS = 3/8 and TP = 1/2. The horizontal axis measures 
taste for speakers while the vertical axis measures taste for phones. 
{,B} 
{B,B} 
{A,A} 
{B,B} 
{A,A} {,A} 
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Era 2: Phones and bundles only 
 
Era 3: All combinations available 
 
Era 4: Future device with α = 3/8 
 
Figure 5. Consumer market shares with S = 1/4, TS = 5/8 and TP = 3/4 (violating Assumption 2 as in 
Proposition 5). The horizontal axis measures taste speakers while the vertical axis measures 
taste for phones. 
The intuition behind this result is that the 
indifference lines bordering {,A} and {,B} expand 
into the neighboring regions as α increases because (1) 
the mixed-vendor bundles become less compelling 
because the watches gain traits from the disfavored 
phone and (2) marginal single-vendor bundle 
Consumers suffer a bigger increase in phone-dimension 
misfit than their decrease in watch-dimension misfit. 
A phone-like watch turns out to be a bad deal for 
vendors: The Consumers who mix a smartphone and a 
smartwatch from different vendors do so because they 
dislike the phone associated with their preferred watch. 
Making the watch more like that phone is a case where 
adding features actually hurts sales, as shown in Figure 
3 wherein the phone-only region grows with higher α.  
 
4.5. Smart speakers 
 
We consider the market for the less-mobile 
complement (smart home appliance, a.k.a. smart 
speaker) to be separate from that of the more-mobile 
complement (smartwatch) because the two are not 
substitutes for one another. The market for smart 
speakers is expected to evolve through the same four 
eras discussed above for smartphones. The difference is 
that as essentially immobile devices controlled 
primarily through voice commands, horizontal 
differentiation should be weaker than that of 
smartphones rather than stronger. The analysis would 
also apply to smart security systems, climate controllers, 
microwave ovens, etc. 
 
Assumption 4: Smart speaker tastes are weaker than 
smartphone tastes such that TS < TP and tS < tP.■ 
 
Lemma 2: A complementary product with lower misfit 
costs than the smartphone’s will always cover all 
Consumers, and the market will exhibit less mixed-
product bundling that the smartwatch market.■ 
The intuition behind this result is that since optimal 
prices can cover the Consumer market with smartphone-
strength tastes, optimal prices will also cover the 
Consumer market for smart speakers once the market 
reaches equilibrium. Consumers also find their less-
preferred smart speaker less distasteful than their less-
preferred smartwatch, so single-vendor bundles are 
more compelling. See Figure 4 which has the same 
parameter values as in Figure 2 except with TS = 3/8. 
Interestingly, while the introduction of α in Era 4 
cannot possibly increase adoption, it may still be helpful 
to firms. The utility function for firm A’s new device is: 
 
𝑢𝑆𝐴(𝑥, 𝑦) =  
𝑢𝑆 + 𝑁𝑆𝑞𝑆𝐴 − √1 − 𝛼2 ∙ 𝑥 ∙ 𝑇𝑆 − 𝛼 ∙ 𝑦 ∙ 𝑇𝑃  
 
Proposition 4: Adding smartphone features to the smart 
speaker, such that it causes a blend of misfit costs across 
the phone and speaker dimensions, weakly decreases 
mixed-product bundling.■ 
 
The intuition behind this result is that the smart 
speaker Consumer market is fully covered under weaker 
conditions than Assumption 2, so Consumers are more 
properly thought of as considering a phone to go with 
their speaker. The more phone-like the speaker 
becomes, the more the market shares resemble the 
phone-only market shares in Era 1, which increases the 
number of Consumers using their preferred smartphone. 
However, there is a further consequence of the 
phone being a complement to the speaker. Consider a 
market in which firms focus on core customers’ tastes 
[8] to the extent that the transport/misfit cost increases 
beyond the limit in Assumption 2. 
 
{A,} 
{B,} 
{B,B} 
{A,A} 
{A,} 
{B,} 
{B,B} 
{A,A} 
{A,B} 
{B,A} 
{B,B} 
{A,A} 
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Proposition 5: Maintaining Assumptions 1, 3 and 4 but 
violating Assumption 2 leads to a market where some 
Consumers purchase a smartphone solely due to its 
supper-additive utility with a smart speaker. Consumers 
who purchase a single device purchase a smart speaker 
and no smartphone.■ 
 
The intuition behind this result is that a group of 
Consumers with intermediate y indices would prefer an 
outside option to the smartphones offered. This outside 
option would be the modern version of a feature phone 
(including some social media features, but no app 
ecosystem). Figure 5 shows that depending on model 
parameters, some of these Consumers may purchase a 
single-vendor bundle {A,A} or {B,B}, but others may 
maximize their utility with the bundles {A,} and 
{B,} which have never had positive market share in 
any other configuration. 
In short, the smart home appliance evolves from a 
networked complement to the smartphone into a 
networked substitute for it. 
Note that violating Assumption 2 means that Lemma 
2 may no longer hold, which would lead to a positive 
market share for {,} (a Consumer with a feature 
phone and no smart home appliance). In either case, 
Proposition 4 continues to hold, and adding phone-like 
features to the smart speaker reduces mixed-product 
bundling. 
 
5. Discussion  
 
We model the evolution of the market for 
smartphones and complementary goods in four distinct 
eras. Each era is discussed in turn. 
In the first era, smartphones exist as stand-alone 
products. They exhibit cross-side network effects but 
otherwise behave in a manner that is disconnected from 
other networked markets. A universe of complementary 
goods emerged providing docks, cases, chargers, 
vehicle interfaces, and so on, but these goods did not 
exhibit the kinds of cross-side network effects that 
would significantly affect adoption of one smartphone 
over another. 
In the second era, firms introduce a new networked 
good that might provide minimal functionality on its 
own, but only functions fully – and indeed enjoys 
complementarity – when paired with a smartphone from 
the same vendor. For example, an early generation 
Apple Watch was not capable of much without a 
constant connection to an iPhone. 
The market outcomes for strong-taste items (i.e., 
wearables) and weak-taste items (i.e., smart home 
appliances) are somewhat different, but the differences 
appear to be more in degree than in kind. Note that our 
model predicts that smartwatches are unlikely to achieve 
full adoption by consumers, but that smart home 
appliances should be expected to eventually. 
In the third era, the newer networked good achieves 
reasonable stand-alone functionality. An example of an 
era 3 device is a smartwatch that does not require pairing 
with a smartphone. For the first time, a consumer who 
prefers devices from different vendors can expect each 
to work properly, although the complementarity 
between devices from the same vendor still exists. 
At this point, the new networked goods theoretically 
pose a substitution threat to the incumbent smartphone 
platforms. We show that the threat from wearables like 
smartwatches is hypothetical, but the threat from smart 
home appliances is plausible given the historical trends 
in industries where technical capability grows faster 
than consumers’ collective ability to harness that 
capability [8]. The newer device becomes good enough 
for most consumers, and the incumbent device withers. 
In the fourth era, assuming that smart homes don’t 
make smartphones obsolete, we posit that vendors 
would import the look and feel of their incumbent 
platform to their newer non-smartphone devices. 
Examples might be adding a large collection of gesture 
controls to smartwatch screens, or adding a home screen 
style interface to smart speakers. 
The impact of phone-like features is quite different 
for each class of devices. The devices like smartwatches 
and other wearables with strong consumer tastes 
increase the utility for core customers but actually 
causes defections from the platform on the margins. On 
the other hand, devices with weak consumer tastes like 
smart speakers benefit from this type of stylistic 
integration even if does not improve the functional 
complementarity between the smart speaker and the 
smartphone. 
Firms would be well served to increase the 
functional complementarity (“synergy”) between any of 
their networked devices (represented by S in the model). 
A higher S leads to more consumers preferring a single-
vendor bundle, increasing utility for core and marginal 
consumers alike. 
Firms should be cautious about increasing the taste 
compatibility (“homogenizing the look and feel”) 
between smartphones and devices that have stronger 
consumer tastes (represented by α in the model). We 
expect that wearables will follow a path toward high 
differentiation while smart home appliances will follow 
a path toward modest differentiation, but it is 
conceivable that either or both predictions may prove 
inaccurate. 
 
Page 6841
6. Conclusion  
 
The conventional wisdom in economics and strategy 
that any two products are either complements or 
substitutes. In this research centered in technology 
markets, we identified cases in which a device, such as 
a smart home appliance, is a networked complement 
initially, but as its capabilities evolve over time, it may 
become a networked substitute to today’s dominant 
computing platform, the smartphone. We identify and 
characterize four eras to capture this evolution of smart 
devices. 
The second contribution of this research is that we 
characterize two very different emerging tech trends 
(wearables and smart speakers) in one parsimonious 
analytical framework. 
Our third contribution is an economic model of the 
Internet of Things (IoT). As we discussed in the 
background, there is an extensive literature on the 
technical aspects of IoT, but very little understanding of 
the economics of IoT. We hope that this will become a 
growing area of research in information systems and 
related fields. 
The fourth contribution of this work is that we 
analyzed the strategic impact of emerging tech trends 
such as wearables (smartwatches) and AI-enabled 
connected devices (e.g., smart speakers) on mobile 
computing (smartphones). As technology and other 
companies position themselves for the future waves of 
emerging tech innovations, our analysis provides 
managers with important actionable strategic insights:  
First, the current generation of smartwatches drives 
sales primarily through complementarity with 
smartphones, but not all consumers find this 
combination compelling. For example, someone may 
prefer the iPhone to an Android phone, yet 
simultaneously prefer an Android Wear watch to the 
Apple Watch. Tying smartwatches to smartphones in 
this way therefore generates some deadweight loss. 
Stand-alone smartwatches hold the promise of serving 
many of these consumers. 
Second, note that the ability of a smartwatch to make 
phone calls is not dangerous because making phone 
calls is a hygiene factor on a smartphone rather than a 
differentiating one. 
Third, technology vendors would do well to increase 
the complementarity between their phones and watches, 
but the two products should remain distinct. 
Fourth, on the other hand, vendors for general-
purpose smart home appliances like smart speakers do 
not face a similar penalty for importing smartphone 
features. In fact, the logical end-point is for full 
integration with smartphones. There is one caveat 
however: a household may contain members who prefer 
different smartphones. 
The future looks very interesting for the consumers, 
developers, and vendors of computing platforms. Our 
examination of the relationship between wearables, 
mobile computing, and smart homes shows that these 
relationships are not static. In particular, if smart 
appliances become common in homes, vehicles, places 
of business, etc. then the smartphone – today’s essential 
must-have device – may find itself suddenly redundant. 
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